Cicero wrote this manifest (54–51 BCE) to call his fellow citizens to their senses and remind them of what united rather than separated them, yet could no more avert the breakdown of the Roman Republic (49 BCE). For nearly two millennia, only the 6th book of this work was known, the Dream of Scipio. In this, both Scipio’s natural father Aemilius Paullus (the conqueror of king Perseus of Macedon) and his adoptive father Scipio, the son of Scipio Africanus the Elder, who had overcome Hannibal, reminded him of the heavenly rewards for those who guide their nations with justice, courage, and sacrifice. Angelo Mai’s discovery gave us major parts of the first books which comprise conversations Scipio had with his friends towards the end of his life in 129 BCE. Their discussion of the ideal state embraced the theory of Aristotle who had first taught that a mix of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements is a source of stability and balance. And Scipio borrowed from Polybius the view that the Roman Republic was the embodiment of this perfect state.

The largely lost 5th book was commonly believed to portray some of the most distinguished Roman ancestors who had made the Republic great and bestowed their wisdom on its institutions. But it now becomes clear that this book also included chapters on more problematic figures, to caution younger generations. The depiction of the career of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus is nearly complete, except for the lacunose first sentences. It is not a simplistic account of a dark figure, an apparent anti-hero, but one of a most gifted man with great ideas, yet without restraint and lacking the greater picture. As such, Cicero – or Scipio the Younger – had already mentioned Tiberius in passing beforehand (Republic 1.31):

… why, in one State, we have almost reached the point where there are two Senates and two separate peoples? For, as you observe, the death of Tiberius Gracchus and, even before his death, the whole character of his tribunate, divided one people into two factions.

It was the concern about this ever-deeper rift going through the nation and its institutions which prevented Scipio from defending his cousin Tiberius, which induced Cicero to remind his fellow citizens who were torn between Cato, Caesar, and Pompey. And it is a similar concern that let Ben forget all his other duties until he made heard again these warnings.

… born to riches, power, and greatness … distinguished family … great-grandfather a consul who conquered Sardinia; great-uncle consul during the war against Hannibal and deputy to Fabius Maximus. Father consul twice and even secured two triumphs. Mother the daughter of Scipio Africanus, so he came from a marriage that connected the Gracchi and the Scipiones. His sister married Scipio Aemilianus just before he captured and destroyed Carthage. I review these genealogical details to say: He came from the highest of stock. He also had his own gifts. He was trained in philosophy and oratory. He was intellectually talented.

Picture him as a young man: He was destined for a great career. A consulship seemed an easy path away. His family connections set him on the road. His first service to the public could not have been a better situation: he not only served under his brother-in-law Scipio Aemilianus in what became known as the Third Punic War; he even shared his tent. He made the most of the opportunity, showing uncommon bravery when he was the first Roman soldier to climb over the wall of an enemy town. He came back to Rome and married a young woman named Claudia from another of our oldest and most outstanding families, the Claudii, who themselves may have held as many as twenty consulships.

Chosen to serve as quaestor, assigned to serve the consul Gaius Hostilius Mancinus in his campaign against Numantia in Spain. This is when his problems began, because Mancinus was an incompetent general. I will go into some detail because it was the next set of events that changed Tiberius’s life, and thereby, the history of Rome. Mancinus kept losing on the battlefield and retreated into his fortified camp. In a panic, the worst emotion for a general, he tried to retreat at night. They were completely surrounded. Mancinus asked for peace. The Numantines knew about the family connections of Tiberius, and demanded that he, not Mancinus, do the negotiating for the Roman side. Tiberius worked out what I think was a reasonable agreement, allowing the thousands of Roman soldiers to leave, while giving the booty to the Spaniards. Given the situation that Tiberius found himself in through no fault of his own, I believe he did the best he could.

But this was not the way many senators, including his own brother-in-law Scipio Aemilianus, saw his negotiated settlement. They thought it was a disaster and a disgrace for Rome. They wanted the treaty to be nullified. They thought the army and its leaders should be sent back to Numantia in chains.

This may have been how Scipio and his like felt, but there was a very different reaction from the public. Obviously, many citizens were the family and friends of the soldiers who survived because of Tiberius. They also understood that it was Mancinus, not Tiberius, who was at fault. The wars in Spain were unpopular partly because they were long and had long since drained any enthusiasm.

This divide reflects a deeper split that often manifests itself in our history. The public, which furnishes most of the soldiers, is often not as keen as the elite, who may be sitting in the comfort of their estates, to go fight wars that are seen as unnecessary at best, wars that are seen to have nothing to do with the lives of the average people who will be the ones to die.

Tiberius thus became a hero to the people – and a problem for the unity of the state.

Now Tiberius needed to make a choice between the elitist establishment of his family, who had denigrated and attacked his reputation, and the people, who loved him. As an ambitious man, he needed to calculate what his road to a consulship might now be, given how his situation had changed. He was no longer the golden child, and the chances seemed remote that the elite would offer him the same road that they once seemed sure to offer.

So, he put in with the people. I see this as a cold, practical decision.

He found a complex but very real issue by which to increase that support: land ownership and economic inequality. Tiberius looked at the Italian countryside and did not see what a reasonable man might want to see: Roman landowners of small but decent-size farms. Instead, he saw barbarian slaves working large estates for wealthy men. In a sense, it was the same divide as with the army and war; the elite wanted war and profited from it; the people died in the war and profited little. The economic inequality pervaded war and peace.

He waited until Scipio left to redeem Rome’s power in Spain and stood for election as a tribune of the plebs. His supporters wrote their slogans and expressions of admiration on walls all over the city. Learning how to raise passion, he stoked fear by speaking about a slave rebellion in Sicily. He said that the result of barbarians working on the large estates could be danger for all free men.

He won and immediately began to work on a bill for land reform to provide land to more of Rome’s citizens. He focused on land, scattered throughout Italy, taken from cities that opposed Rome in war and was now publicly owned. The state had rented this kind of land to free men, but there was supposed to be a maximum of 500 acres* to any individual. This was a fair law, but it was not monitored or enforced, and many gained lands far above the maximum.

Tiberius came up with a plan to require those who held land above the limit to return it to the state, but for compensation. The returned land would then be redistributed in parcels of 30 acres* to Roman citizens.

Tiberius appealed to the public without seeming to be a demagogue and while seeming sensitive to those who would get hurt by his new measures. Or, to put it differently, even men who become demagogues rise because of an appeal that is very real and persuasive.

*The Roman acre (iugerum) is a bit smaller than the American, it is about 0.25 hectares.

History is based on the actions of men, and often those men, thinking, intelligent men, simply make mistakes. And sometimes those mistakes have far-reaching consequences that could not be foreseen. If Tiberius’s land reforms had been quickly voted into law, what followed would have been very different. The Senate refused to accept the proposal. Why? Did they already fear Tiberius? It was too soon for them to appreciate who he might become. No, I think it had to do with how they saw the role of government. There were rich and there were poor, and the senators liked the status quo. Perhaps the Senators did not like the idea that the State should distribute or re-distribute land. Perhaps they simply feared change.

The next move belonged to Tiberius. He could accept defeat and simply withdraw his bill. The Senate may have assumed that Tiberius would do this. Instead, he made a most unusual move, one which shows what a different kind of man he was. He went over or around the Senate and went directly to the Assembly of the Plebeians. This only made the Senators angrier, and they turned to Octavius, another tribune, who then opposed Tiberius and vetoed his proposal. This, in turn, made Tiberius furious. But in the midst of his fury, he was calculating. He knew, again, that he would never return to the good graces of the elite. His only route to power would be through the will of the people.

When I say that he was going straight to the people, I mean that he called for public debates with Octavius. And he got personal in his attacks; he said that Octavius himself owned huge tracts of such public land and accused him of opposing the law for his own benefit. After some other moves, Tiberius called for a vote. And then on the day of the balloting, the voting urns disappeared! The opponents of the bill had repressed the vote.

The supporters of Tiberius were ready to riot. Tiberius said that he and Octavius should stand before the assembly on the question of whether they should continue as tribunes. Tiberius said that Octavius should be removed from office; since the assembly had put him in the office of tribune. When Octavius refused to participate, he was stripped of his office. Octavius was fortunate to escape from the mob and survive.

I pause to consider the new ground that was being broken. Tiberius was not only provoking the politics of resentment against Octavius; Octavius was now the symbol of the elite. Everything and everyone that the common Romans had ever resented, all of their own failures, their lack of a noble birth, it was all channeled now into fists of rage. It is a short step from the threat of violence to the reality of violence. When you have stoked the flames, there is no way to know when they might break out and engulf someone.

There was, of course a strong reaction to the politics of resentment; it intensified the opposition and created fear. With Octavius off the council, and the veto off the table, the reforms were passed. Tiberius and his brother were two of the three commissioners chosen to redistribute the land. And he had accused Octavius of being self-serving!

The Senate had its own weapons; it could refuse to fund all the operations needed to set up the distribution of the land, which was very complicated and expensive. The reforms would have died without these funds.

There are many forces in this world and some of them cannot be seen or anticipated. One of them is Fortune. When Attalus of Pergamum died, he left his kingdom and its wealthy treasury to “the Roman people.” In the usual course of events, the Senate would have administered this great gift. But Tiberius interpreted the will of Attalus to say that the funds should pay for the land commission and everything that would be needed to distribute the land.

After a very public and very noisy debate, the Assembly backed Tiberius and said that the funds from Pergamum should finance the land reform. But the results of all this were not really about land reform, but about the norms of political decision-making. And one of the Senators charged Tiberius of having taken a crown and purple robe out of Attalus’s treasury.

This was now a contest between two bodies, the Senate and the Assembly of the Plebeians. It is interesting how the very personal becomes the political, which becomes the financial, which becomes the institutional, which becomes the historical.

How shall we think about Tiberius at this point? He had moved from redistribution of land to rebalancing of power. Perhaps, if this had really been about the Senate and the assembly, the reaction of the Senate would not have been quite as dramatic. But Tiberius was in the middle of everything, and Rome always fears the individual strongman. Tiberius had quickly become more important, more vital, than anyone would have ever imagined. He had become a master of resentment and a commander of frustration. He looked like a tyrant-in-the-making.

I now come back to the issue of violence. For so many years, there was a constitutional division of power. Political matters were discussed and decided in the Senate. The people elected the decision-makers and they even had the final chance to say yes or no, but they could not take matters in their own hands and act disorderly. The popular assembly had always respected this.

But Tiberius changed it all. If there were personal attacks at him, he responded and started rumors that he had been threatened or one of his friends had been poisoned. He could be seen walking the streets with angry supporters all around him, supposedly for his protection. Tiberius might never have explicitly called for violence, say, against Octavius, but his words were threatening, and his supporters understood his meaning.

Now came another juncture; the end of his one-year term as tribune. The sacredness of the office had protected him in many ways, but out of office, he would not have those protections if he were a mere citizen again. There were rumors that his opponents would target him, and they may well have been true. So, what did he do? He ran for a second term. No decent tribune aimed for re-election, after this had led into anarchy centuries ago.

Tiberius preyed on people’s fears, saying that their very safety depended on him staying in that office. It was fear versus fear, fear of the strongman against fear without the strongman. When the vote came, the legality of a second term was questioned, and the assembly had to adjourn. That night, Tiberius feared for his life, saying that he was going to be killed at his home; his supporters spent the night encamped around his house.

When the morning came and the assembly was supposed to meet, all the anger and tension and controversy exploded in an orgy of violence. In the horrible battle between the mobs of the Senate and Tiberius, the latter was clubbed to death and two or three hundred Romans were killed.

Tiberius Gracchus is not just a cautionary tale from the past. Tiberius was not just raised to be a good citizen of Rome; he was raised to be a leader of Rome. But when one path to power was closed to him, he opened a path that had never been trodden, because it was a path to ruin, not only for him, but for all. Rome is right to fear the tyrant and the strong man; it is right to balance power and to limit the rulership of any individual. The struggle between the state and those who would dominate it, is constant and ongoing.

A state must have standards of decency. Institutions must respect and balance each other. People must respect the domains of the government; the government must respect the domains of the people. The Republic cannot survive with swords and clubs.

If we are not vigilant, and yes, if we are not willing to respond to those who would divide us in the name of their ambition, the Republic will not stand.