The conference was dedicated to the study of empires from (post-) Hittite times to the present, with a declared focus on ideological constructs claiming the succession to previous empires. The first section of this report surveys those papers that tackled the set topic of transfer of imperial rule as a source of legitimacy (1); the second showcases literary approaches to imperial rule, two papers deconstructing near-canonical lines of succession of ancient empires designed to (de)legitimate present rules and another two engaging with imperial culture in modern periods (2); third comes a set of papers that confront the European Union as if it were an empire or that propose new approaches to cultural policies in the European Union (3). Many of the papers turned out different than expected, so that they have been regrouped for this report, whereas the list of papers at the end presents them in the order as they were given (4). Further reflection on the political implications, such as on European Nationalisms and the difficulty of identifying a Leitkultur (‘leading culture’) for a nation state or the European Union as a whole have been published in The Community Edition (August 2022 edition) and on the Think-Centrist platform (# 5). Another report followed by a few critical thoughts has been submitted to H-Soz-Kult.

Participants were warmly welcomed by Justyna Schulz, the director of the Instytut Zachodni for Western Affairs. The location of the conference host in Poland’s western-most major city with a rich historical heritage predestined it for its mission: the study of European, though mainly German, history and Poland’s diplomatic relations towards the West – a remarkable goal for an institution established while World War II was still raging in 1944. A natural development of what has become the Think Tank of Poland’s Foreign Relations is a critical engagement with all matters European Union.

The first paper by Thomas Zimmermann (Bilkent University, Ankara) began by surveying Anatolian empires of the Late-Bronze and Early-Iron ages. Against this background, epigraphic evidence for four barely known petty dynasties who ruled in south-eastern Asia Minor from about the tenth to eighth centuries BCE was presented. Explicit genealogical links with the former Hittite kings or royal names echoing those of the more prominent predecessors demonstrate how this first true empire centring in Anatolia inspired later generations. In the discussion, effective genealogical links through the matriline (so typical also for Hellenistic Asia Minor) were suggested for consideration. Another question to be asked more explicitly is whether the recourse of the past Hittite past was meant to signal universalist claims.

Germain Payen (Lille University) introduced into the ideology of the Aspurgian dynasty of the Bosporan kingdom (1st-4th centuries CE). He identified four recurring motifs, two of which were more explicit (descent from Mithradates VI Eupator Dionysos as well as ‘friendship’ with Rome, which gradually included the propagation of the Roman emperor’s cult), and two of which are rather implicit (Thracian descent and Sarmatian connections). This unique mix of ideological roots yielded a peculiar type of ethnic-dynastic identity, implying the universalist pretensions of Mithradates on the one hand, while presenting the Bosporan king as the representative of the Imperium Romanum on the other.

After pleading the general importance of an ideological structure to support imperial rule, Loïc Borgies (Namur University) compared various aspects of empire building of ancient Rome and China. His particular focus was on the use of symbolic objects to legitimate new dynastic rule as an imperial refoundation. It is well known that Augustus tried to shape Roman monarchy as a revived Roman Republic after the upheavals of the civil wars (49-30 BCE). But we are less acquainted with his collection of pignora imperii (‘Talismans of Power’), sacred objects of obscure legendary origin, such as the Palladium, a sculpture of Athena. The number of these objects was canonized as seven in the later tradition. The speaker identified a striking Chinese parallel in the Nine Cauldrons (九鼎), whose legendary origin goes back to the 2nd millennium BCE. Reportedly, they were taken to the new capital Xinjang when the previous Zhou dynasty was extinguished. Ownership of them symbolized the heavenly mandate to rule, where their loss by the time of the Qin dynasty in 221 BCE could be construed as a lack of legitimacy.

Augustine Dickinson (Hamburg University) acquainted the audience with the foundation legend of the Solomonic Dynasty of Ethiopia. It is rooted in the biblical Queen of Sheba, who visited king Solomon in Jerusalem (1 Kings 10; 2 Chron 9:1–9). As the legend goes, they had a son who later brought the Ark of the Covenant (in German the ‘Bundeslade’) to Ethiopia. More than two millennia later, in 1270 CE, his alleged descendant Yəkunno ʾAmlāk came to power and enlarged the territory. He fostered the further spread of Christianity in the region, which was a constitutive step in the rise of the Ethiopian-Orthodox church, with millions of members in Africa, the Near East and North America. Scholarship on this dynasty is not new, but still limited due to the lack of sources and often also a mere descriptive approach to the transmitted narratives. For those unfamiliar with the political history in Medieval Africa, it would have been desirable to learn more about the neighbouring rules, which were potential ideological sources or competitors. Was the dynastic legend shaped more to impress the subjects already imbued with Jewish-Christian traditions or geared towards the major imperial powers, such as the Byzantine Empire, Mamluk Egypt or the Abbasid Khalifate? The main text sources of the 17th century already reflect a more recent connection with European Christianity including Rome, as the speaker explained.

Stone Chen (University of Waterloo) took the discussion back to China. After a long list of authoritative modern definitions of English ‘empire’, he observed the lack of a Chinese equivalent with long historical roots. Ying-bai-er, the transliterated version of English ‘empire’, is used only sparsely. The most typical term diguo was long thought to be leaning on the Japanese term teikoku, since the term a different meaning in Classical times, but Chen has seen evidence for its use as ‘rule of an emperor’ before 1890, on which more research yet needs to be done. At any rate, the aforementioned terms denote non-Chinese empires of the past or present. However, a variety of ancient Chinese concepts can still be related broadly to the notion of empire, such as jiuzhou (the ‘nine provinces’), which reflects the situation until the 3rd century BCE and recalls the legend of the Nine Cauldrons. Most prominent is the notion of tian (‘heaven’), as in tianxia (‘all under heaven’) and tianming (‘mandate of Heaven’). The former is a clear expression of the universalist component of traditional Chinese rule. The latter needs to be claimed by every Chinese ruler or rule, and thus implies not only divine support but also a transition of legitimacy, just as the European concepts of renovatio or translatio. Chen ended by drawing attention to a recent Chinese trend to explicitly deny that the country under the rule of the Communist Party is a diguo, while it claims to have the tianming.

In combination with the guided tour through historical Poznań, the paper by David Engels (Poznań / Bruxelles) on the “Kaiserschloss” was the highlight of the conference. He began by surveying the city’s history from the foundation of the first cathedral in 968 over the settlement of Germans under the Magdeburg Rights in 1253, followed by the vicissitudes under the Jagiellonian and (Hohen)Zollern rules, ending with the frequent political changes after World War I. Unsurprisingly, the palace commissioned by Kaiser Wilhelm in the early-20th century reflected a German-Prussian view on the past, with radical ideological shifts in the interwar period (Second Polish Republic), the times of Nazi occupation (which bequeathed the atticizing décor of the Hitler tract), and Soviet hegemony (which left behind kind of a Polish-national and Marxist ‘Ahnengalerie’) prior to the current Third Republic, under which the monument has become a museum. Unlike any other contribution, Engels was able to show how flexibly the ruling classes of each period reconfigured its ethnic-ideological identity by selecting and rejecting specific imperial pasts. Reflecting on this enriching experience, I cherish the hope that opportunities as offered by this museum to the citizens of Poznań and beyond be embraced more fully and to show that all national histories are constructs guided by perceived convenience rather than a objective scholarly assessment of the facts.

The Book of Daniel includes visions of successive kingdoms. Its protagonist is presented as living at royal courts in the 6th century BCE, though the latest text layer dates from 164/3 BCE. Christians regard(ed) the kingdoms as Babylon, Media/Persia, Macedon and Rome, whereas critical scholarship has established that the latest allusions were to the Seleukid king Antiochos IV Epiphanes (175-164 BCE). Altay Coşkun (University of Waterloo) identified earlier historical contexts for three of the imperial allegories: the first ended with Cyrus, the Persian founder king, who up-ended Babylonian rule (539 BCE); the second replaced Cyrus by Alexander the ‘Great’ as the destroyer king; the third layer extended (in three distinct steps through the 160s BCE) the empire allegories to culminate with Antiochos IV as the one who would bring about the apocalypse to pave the way to the eternal rule of god. This study demonstrated the flexibility with which mythical, religious, and historical traditions were adapted to suite anti-imperialist constructs.

Rabbi Ben Scolnic extended the examination on Daniel by focusing on the most influential Christian, Neoplatonic and Jewish interpretations that would anticipate all later reception. The Church Father Jerome (around 400) understood the last earthly rule as Roman and the apocalyptic king as the Anti-Christ who was yet to come. In contrast, Porphyry (around 300 BCE) laid the ground to the present common opinion that most of the allegories were formulated by a contemporary of Antiochus. Often overlooked is the fact that Porphyry, too, pursued an ideological agenda, blundering historicity for the parts which ‘Daniel’ only prophesised and further surmising a cyclical world view in accordance with his own philosophy. The biggest surprise for me was that the visions found only scarce reception in the Jewish tradition, since they were acknowledged as failed. Jewish perception shifted towards the court narratives of chapters 1–6, in which Daniel is the pious wise man. As such, he was still venerated in the medieval tradition, when the emblematic story of the crystal coffin of Daniel was composed.

The abstract of Henrieke Stahl (Trier University) announced an exploration of the perspectives on Putin in poetical or satirical modern-media posts, but this was only touched on briefly in the introduction. She then turned to three Russian authors of the early-modern period and looked for subtle criticism of the tsar in their works. A particular focus was on the Russian poet Pushkin (1799-1837), who laid the ground to a Romanticized national literature while also leaning towards liberalism in post-Napoleonic Russia. In the discussion, Stahl’s interpretation was criticized as too subtle and thus apologetic. However, having worked intensively on (ancient) panegyric literature myself, I would endorse at least the possibility that this genre could be used for carefully addressing problems – as long as the monarch and his family were not tainted by such criticism.

Misia Doms (Mannheim) explored the works of two leading Austrian writers of the earlier 20th century, Alexander Lernet-Holenia (1897-1976) and Joseph Roth (1894-1937). Both left behind a very diverse literary bequest, so that the emphasis was on ‘Die Standarte’ of the former (1934) and ‘Der Radetzkymarsch’ by the latter (1932). These works deal with the latest Habsburg Empire, described as emptied of purpose and doomed to fall, whether due to an alienation of the subjects from an emperor of divine grace or even to a metaphysical force. Lernet-Holenia and Roth thus continued the fin-de-siècle mood. The spirit of Oswald Spengler, it seems, was hovering over their books – and also Doms’ talk. These writings address the empire as one of the past with no future, which is symbolically implied in the paper’s main title ‘Ashes without Phoenix’. Doms offered no historical or political conclusion, but the most natural to follow would have been to claim that ideology is needed as a sociopolitical glue. Yet this should lead to the follow-up question on the nature of this ideology: should it be national or imperial or else?

Ancient imperialism was addressed one more time, if only in passing, by Grzegorz Lewicki (independent, Gdańsk) in his search for a historical model for modern multiculturality. But his survey of the Roman Empire mixed together characteristics from distinct centuries of Roman as if pertaining to a synchronous rule. Some more fine-tuning is required to allow Roman imperial experiences to feed into a political tool kit. In particular, the positive perspective on ancient Christianity lacked awareness of the violent stance the later Romans took against pagans, Jews and heterodox Christians. More attractive was the comparison of the Ottoman and Jagiellonian empires. Lewicki acknowledged the tolerance of the Ottomans towards Jews and Christians, although the primacy of Islam imposed strict limitations. This became the focus of heated debates in the audience. One participant argued against the idealization of Ottoman tolerance with a view to the genocide of the Armenians, whereas others argued that this late escalation may well be seen as the result of European nationalisms and should not define the critical assessment of earlier Ottoman practices. Or should World War I narrowly define the values of the Christian empires involved? If compared with early-modern European kingdoms, the conclusions on Ottoman religious policies should be more generous. The Polish-Lithuanian kingdom under the Jagiellonians (14th-17th centuries) was said to have offered a higher level of tolerance to many different Christian denominations. This may be true, but the situation of Jews or Muslims was barely touched on, which renders a comparison difficult. Since, in addition, this kingdom was characterized not as an empire but as a republic, this historical construct was presented as the ideological ancestor of the Third Polish Republic (or, more adequately, the Republic under the currently ruling national-conservative PIS party). Finally, current-day Germany was chosen to present a contrast model. In principle, this could have been helpful to guide an informed discussion, but surmising that Germany advocates “unconditional” immigration is misleading. And yet it was useful for me to see that this is the perspective of even educated Poles. Lewicki dubbed his proposal “Medievalisation”, irrespective of the stigma that this term still carries for most Europeans, at least outside Poland. At any rate, Lewicki’s paper exemplified the desire of many conservatives Poles to stick to their (strongly Catholic) traditions and to find inspirations in their own past.

The presentation of Grzegorz Kucharczyk (Gorzów / Warsaw University) took us to the Wilhelmine Prussian Empire and the escalation of nationalist policies during World War I. The first focus was on Friedrich Naumann’s book ‘Mitteleuropa’, a bestseller at its time (1915) that tried to weigh in on the discussions of Germany’s war aims. In contrast to the military, which aimed at an extension of the multiethnic Prussian-German empire by annexation, Naumann suggested a more liberal approach: national states in the east should maintain a certain level of autonomy, albeit as protectorates of the Reich. Kucharczyk rightly explained that Naumann’s plan was rejected by the government at the time, let alone later “Nazi Germany” with its genocidal agenda. Yet, Naumann’s thoughts were still tainted by a mix of Idealism and Social Darwinism, so that he would make a difficult model for our own time.

But who would do so? More educated Germans may relate Naumann’s name to the ‘Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit’, which provides scholarships for young students with affinities for the ‘Freie Demokratische Partei’ (this has no counterpart in the British or North American Political spectrum and hovers somewhere in the middle between the Conservatives and the Social Democrats / ‘Liberals’ / ‘Democrats’). However, the vast majority even of the German political elites have no clue of his publications, as all German conference participants confirmed, rejecting the idea that Naumann’s views had any influence on German political thought. Kucharczyk, however, insisted that “Naumann’s vision … is gaining new momentum in the 21st century. A ‘benevolent hegemony’ of Germany in the European Union is proof of Mitteleuropa 2.0’. Responses from the audience questioned the speaker’s understanding of Germany’s role in the EU and of the views that Germans hold of Poland in the 21st century.

Zdzisław Krasnodębski (Bremen) explored imperial aspects of Polish-German relations much further back than the 19th and 20th centuries, as proposed in the subtitle. I have no expertise to critically assess some of the speaker’s claims, but wonder if the insistence on the Jagiellonian kingdom (which ranged from Prussia over Lithuania to Moscow and Kyiv) as anti-imperialist and even republican in nature is endorsed also in critical international scholarship. At any rate convincing was his argument that Polish nationalism is strongly anti-imperialist, whereas German nationalism – or perhaps better European nationalisms – dwell(s) on imperialist and racist traditions.

Quite simplistic were the character attributions to ‘the German’ and ‘the Pole’, especially since these avoided to take into account the massive sociopolitical changes in the 2nd half of the 20th century both in Germany and Poland. To be clear, Krasnodębski did not emphasize the historical guilt (of which Germans must always be humbly aware), but rather claimed that Germans continue to be under the influence of idealist philosophers and thus try to find solutions for all and then impose them on all. Polish sensitivities are obviously not only shaped by the genocidal trauma under the Nazis, but also by patronizing trends that intensified since 1848 and are best captured by German drives to offer “Lebenshilfe” to the Poles or foster their “Modernisierung”. Ramifications go back to Kantian philosophy, which Krasnodębski identified as the root of the emphasis on morality in secularized Germany, leading to Angela Merkel’s claim that Germany should be a “moral superpower”.

One may question how accurately Krasnodębski (as well as Kucharczyk’s) descriptions still reflect the realities of recent German political discourse. Much of it seems to dwell on Polish traditions of what Germans are, while being out of touch with what the current generation of German politicians, let alone the youth in the streets actually think about Poland. Somewhat ironically, however, Gerd Morgenthaler (as below) made a strong plea for an idealist foundation of the European project. At any rate, the influence Germany presently wields on European institutions appears grossly overstated, at least in light of each member state’s veto power, which gives citizens of smaller states a disproportionately strong influence. Likewise surprising to me was the fixation of Polish contributions on what Germany is doing (wrong) in the European Union – France, the Benelux, and the Scandinavian states remained entirely unconsidered as progressive players.

Such controversies notwithstanding, Krasnodębski certainly has first-hand knowledge of the European political mechanisms. After all, he is a Professor of Sociology in Bremen (since 1995), a prominent member of the conservative PIS party (since 2005), and a member of the European Parliament, as whose Vice President he served (2018-2019). Despite my points of disagreement, his presentation was very helpful for me to better understand the positions held by the Polish government.

As a Professor of Law at Kraków University, with many publications on German constitutional and European Law, I expected a more balanced approach from Magdalena Bainczyk. Her abstract announced a critical assessment of the democratic and juridical practices of the EU as a basis for a “positive scenario”. What I encountered was distorted partisanship, with no interest in exploring common ground. Her first claim was that the European Union persistently breaks its own constitution by gradually expanding its competences and oppressing national sovereignty. But eclectic quotations from the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) which claims respect of the member states’ national identities (e.g., TEU Art. 4.1) do not supersede the multiple expressions that the foundation of the European Union is an ongoing process of integration and that this requires the deferral of powers away from the nation state to the union. Read only TEU Art. 1:

By this Treaty, the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES establish among themselves a EUROPEAN UNION, hereinafter called ‘the Union’, on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common. This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, …

Bainczyk then complained about how unfairly Poland is treated, citing examples of “German impunity” after disregarding European Law. It is not my intention to justify German policies conflicting with EU rules (which are indeed highly problematic and a major disservice to the integration process). However, I do not remember that a German government ever refused to follow the Court of Justice of the European Union’s decision. Yet Bainczyk claimed that the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the German Supreme Court) ruled in 2020 that the German constitution prevailed over European Law. As was pointed out in the discussion, this is a gross misrepresentation. The decisions from 2019 and 2020 clearly state the prevalence of the European Union’s law, yet the Bundesverfassungsgericht maintains the prerogative to examine whether European legislation is in unison with the competences as defined by the TEU or successive treaties. At all events, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has so far never cast a judgment challenging any specific law of the European Union. If, however, it may do so one day, this will not automatically invalidate the European law; according to the court’s tradition, it will require the German government to work towards eliminating the legal conflict.

Bainczyk’s final criticism was directed against the ‘Conference on the Future of Europe’, a recent project of the European Union that, according to the description on the website of the European Commission, tried to foster democratic involvement in an innovative and direct way:

The Conference on the Future of Europe was a citizen-led series of debates and discussions that ran from April 2021 to May 2022 and enabled people from across Europe to share their ideas and help shape our common future. […] With more than 5 million unique visitors to the platform and more than 700,000 event participants, the Conference succeeded in creating a public forum for an open, inclusive, and transparent debate with citizens around a number of key priorities and challenges.

In contrast, Bainczyk lamented that the conference had altogether no more than 60,000 users, though only 108 “effective users”, out of 300,000 million citizens. It is not my task to enquire the veracity of either set of numbers, though I note that her random play with numbers serves the purpose of discrediting an undertaking that was designed to give a voice to those who are normally disengaged from traditional, institutionalized political processes. And this, I assume, was the real reason for Bainczyk’s dissatisfaction, since any activity potentially leading up to European citizenship seems to be inciting her opposition. This can also be inferred from the extremely short “positive part to conclude” her plea: “to restore balance” between the EU and its member states and to concentrate on “real problems” (which remained undefined). Yet her ultimate conclusion was once more negative: “Further concentration of power in the European Union will not guarantee the stability of the European continent.”

The last paper was delivered by another Professor of Public Law. Gerd Morgenthaler (Siegen University) agreed insofar with Bainczyk as ‘empire’ is not a juridical category. In contrast to Bainczyk, he does accept “the Union’s aim ‘to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’ (Art. 2 [1] TEU) by means of joint, centralized decision-making”. But he notes that it contradicts both modern European tradition of empires and sovereign national states. Following the direction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, he characterizes the EU as a political entity sui generis, at least from a legal perspective, since Völkerrecht does not know a category beyond the national level. But the TEU (e.g., art. 1 and 3) qualifies the EU as a “confederation” (“Staatenverbund”) with elements that indicate a development towards a “federal state” (“Bundesstaat”), such as a shared hymn and flag as well as several European institutions to which member states have commissioned competences.

Since there cannot be a translatio or renovatio imperii, so Morgenthaler argues, other “lenders of legitimacy” must be sought. He finds various indications in the TEU addressing the values supposed to underly the union. Besides the above-quoted Art. 2.1, he also referred to Art. 3.3 [4]: “It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.” His paper led over to a strong plea for drawing on the European traditions of Classical Antiquity, Christianity, Enlightenment, and Idealism, a claim of “renovatio culturae et civilisationis” and “the maintenance and revival of a common European cultural memory”. He called this a variation of the concept of “Hesperialisation”, which David Engels has proposed in many of his publications.

Such value-conservative views might have made further recourse to the preamble of the TEU, which reads: “DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe […]”. Yet the emphasis of the TEU immediately shifts away from a religious focus:

“[…] from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law, …”. Obviously, Morgenthaler wants a conservative shift within the EU, but the vague terms he uses leave important questions open. Who would decide on the ‘right’ choices to be made from the Christian traditions? Should they be distilled from the New Testament, or should they be modelled after the fusion of the church with the imperial Roman state under Constantine I? Are we to maintain the Old Testament with its harsh laws of impurity? How are we to weigh Enlightenment (with its demand of a secular state) against Christianity? How much freedom of choice would remain for born citizens and migrants, would diversity of identity pertain only to member states or individual citizens? Such questions need to be explored in much detail before Christianity, Enlightenment, and Classical Antiquity might serve as models for Europeans in the 21st century.

1. Dr. Justyna Schulz (Poznań): Empires and Imperial Traditions – Yesterday and Tomorrow.

2. Prof. Dr. Thomas Zimmermann (Ankara): “I Reinforced the Realms of My Father and Grandfather” – Conjuring Lost Hittite Imperial Glory in Post-Hittite Perilous Times.

3. Dr. Germain Payen (Lille): The Aspurgian Dynasty in Bosporan History: Mithradatism, Thracian Identity, Graeco-Scythian Past and Sarmatian Influence.

4. Prof. Dr. Altay Coşkun (Waterloo ON): Empire Allegories and Decline in the Book of Daniel.

5. Rabbi Dr. Ben Scolnic (Hamden CT, via zoom): The Crystal Coffin of Daniel: Neoplatonic, Early Christian and Jewish Responses to Daniel’s Vision of the Succession of Empires.

6. Loic Borgies MA (Namur): The Presence of the Past within the Imperial Ideologies of Augustus and Qin and Han Dynasties. An Essay of Comparative Analysis of Talismans of Power: the Pignora Imperii and the Nine Cauldrons.

7. Augustine Dickinson MA (Hamburg): Holy Men and the Holy Ark: The Church, the State, and the Legitimization of the Solomonic Dynasty of Ethiopia.

8. Stone Chen BA (Waterloo ON): Imperial Concepts of China.

9. Dr. Grzegorz Lewicki (Gdańsk): Managing Multiculturalism in Ottoman and Jagiellonian Empires. Lessons for the New Middle Ages.

10. Prof. Dr. Henrieke Stahl (Trier, via zoom): Imperial Conflicts and Historical Traumas in Eastern European Poetry

11. Prof. Grzegorz Kucharczyk (Gorzów / Warsaw): How to Build an Empire? The Mitteleuropa-Plan of Friedrich Naumann.

12. Prof. Dr. David Engels (Poznań / Bruxelles): Poznań’s “Kaiserschloss”: The Strange Fate of Imperial Self-Legitimation in the 20th Century.

13. Prof. Misia Doms (Mannheim, via zoom): Ashes without Phoenix. The End of the Habsburg Empire in the Works by Alexander Lernet-Holenia and Joseph Roth. (remote)

14. Prof. Zdzisław Krasnodębski (Bremen): Imperial Theories in the Context of Polish-German Relations during the 19th and 20th Century

15. Prof. Magdalena Bainczyk (Kraków): Fall and Rise of the European Union. Disputes over the Legal Character of the EU.

16. Prof. Gerd Morgenthaler (Siegen, via zoom): The European Union – Yet Another European Empire or an Institution “sui generis”?

This report represents the understanding and the subjective perspective of its author, one of the co-organizers of and contributors to the conference. Feedback solicited from the co-organizers and selected participants has allowed for various corrections, but full agreement on the political topics in section 3 could not be achieved.

For the author, the main take-away from the conference is that there is need for many more encounters between Germans and Poles, or perhaps more generally between progressives and conservatives, if not between humans that are divided by disagreement and who tend to forget what still unites them. Most disputes will not be resolved at the first encounters, and, in all humility, we must even accept that we may not even agree on establishing facts. Yet every encounter that remains respectful diminishes the discrepancy between what I think that the other thinks and what the other effectively thinks. This takes us one step into the right direction, a small but important step.